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ABSTRACT 
A lack of political leadership is often perceived as the main source of the repeated difficulties of the 
WTO.  The paper argues that such a lack of leadership is a systemic problem for many years to come.  
The large industrial democracies have constitutional rules making particularly difficult trade 
liberalization in agriculture, and their governments rely on majorities which are increasingly thinner, 
hence less resistant to even tiny pressure groups. 
 
Then the paper argues that bilateral trade agreements (“bilaterals”) do not offer a solution to such a 
lack of political leadership.  Firstly, it shows that the often mentioned recent increase in bilaterals 
grossly overestimates the true evolution.  Secondly, it stresses the fact that, so far, the push behind 
these bilaterals comes mostly from the small countries, not from the large ones.  Lastly, it shows that 
the 2006 initiative of the European Commission – the first proactive move of a large country – would 
launch a race to bilaterals so costly that they are unlikely to be sustainable in the long run. 
 
Lastly, the paper argues that improving the efficiency of the WTO negotiating process can offer an 
appropriate solution to a lack of leadership.  It highlights six sources of reform which have one 
common goal – shooting at shorter Rounds – and which would “flexipline” the WTO process, that is, 
discipline it – by focusing on the core WTO business of market access and relying on formulas for 
negotiating market access in goods – and make the WTO process more flexible – by reassessing the 
value of binding tariffs, relying on plurilaterals for negotiating market access in services, re-interpreting 
the Single Undertaking principle, and mellowing the bilaterals by more WTO-friendly rules of origin.. 
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How Much Further Can the WTO Go? 
Developed Countries Issues 
Patrick MESSERLIN1
INTRODUCTION 
A lack of political leadership is often perceived as the main source of the repeated difficulties – indefinite 
suspension ? – of the Doha Round.  This observation triggers two opposite reactions.  First is the belief that 
this situation will be transitory – sooner or later, political leadership will be back.  Section 1 argues that this is 
a dangerous illusion.  The current lack of leadership in the WTO is a systemic problem for the many years, or 
even decades, to come.  Of course, visionary and courageous leaders could emerge at some point in the 
future, but many reasons suggest that such a hope is unwarranted, almost irrational. 
The alternative reaction is that the lack of political leadership is here for a long time, and condemns the WTO-
based multilateral trade system to enter a long coma, all the more because of the massive increase of the 
WTO Members.  Supporters of this view argue that these combined evolutions make necessary to turn to the 
substitute of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), that the shift to PTAs has already begun a decade ago, 
and that it is accelerating.  Section 2 shows that the evidence often used for supporting this view grossly 
overestimates and misinterprets the increase in PTAs.  It also argues that the 2006 initiative of the European 
Commission represents a serious danger to the multilateral trading regime because, although probably 
unsustainable in the long run, it may launch in the short run a race to more PTAs among the large WTO 
Members (which are so far “marginal” players in this game, contrary to what is widely believed). 
How to cope with a systemic lack of political leadership while minimizing the risks created by PTAs?  Section 
3 argues that the medicine usually suggested today – a better monitoring of the PTAs by the WTO – is far to 
be enough.  There is a need to improve the efficiency of the WTO negotiating process:  the more efficient this 
process will be, the less attractive bilaterals will be.  Section 3 highlights six sources of reform which have one 
common goal – shooting at shorter Rounds.  These sources aim at “flexiplining” the WTO process, that is, 
disciplining it – by focusing on the core WTO business of market access, and by relying on formulas for 
negotiating market access in goods—and making it more flexible – by  reassessing the value of binding tariffs, 
by relying on plurilaterals for negotiating market access in services, by re-interpreting the Single Undertaking 
principle, and by mellowing the bilaterals by more WTO-friendly rules of origin.  As these sources reinforce 
each other, each of them can be used more gently than it were alone.  Section 4 concludes by looking at the 
countries which could promote such changes, and by underlining the absolutely crucial role of domestic 
support in such an endeavor. 
I. Domestic politics and leadership in the WTO 
The five first Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations lasted less then 18 months each, the two next ones 
(the Kennedy Round in the 1960s and the Tokyo Round in the 1970s) less than six years, and the last one 
(the Uruguay Round) eight years if one assumes that the Uruguay Round started at the Punta del Este 
meeting (1986-1994), more accurately twelve years if one takes into account the failed start in 1982 – twice 
the time necessary to conclude the Tokyo Round.  The reasons for this drift are well known:  negotiations 
cover an increasing number of issues (technical barriers to trade, customs valuation, government 
procurement, subsidies and dumping, services, agriculture, intellectual property rights, etc.) all of them being 
much more difficult to negotiate than tariffs, and they involve many more WTO Members. 
 
This evolution is putting increasing pressures on the politicians of the developed countries for two reasons.  
They abide by constitutional rules which are unchanged since the end of the Second World War (and 
 
1 / Director of Groupe d’Economie Mondiale at Sciences Po (GEM).  Patrick.messerlin@sciences-po.fr 
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sometimes much before).  They are operating in democracies which are delivering increasingly thin majorities 
– eroding the permissive consensus in favor of freer trade which prevailed until the 1990s. 
 
Constitutional Rules and Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
Key constitutional rules happen to be often biased against further trade liberalization in industrial countries.  
Some rules have a long term impact.  In the U.S., the President has a short four-years mandate that can be 
extended once.  The U.S. President has thus a maximum of eight years for launching and concluding 
multilateral trade negotiations, with a presidential campaign in the middle of these negotiations.  As the 
President needs a year or so to convince Congress (which has the key power of ratifying trade agreements) 
in order to get the “fast track” authority for a full mandate of negotiations, his/her window of opportunity is 
reduced to roughly six years.  This time constraint played no role in the GATT Rounds until the Tokyo Round 
because all these Rounds were concluded in less than six years, but it begun to generate concerns during the 
Uruguay Round, and it is a major constraint for the Doha Round. 2/ 
Other constitutional rules have a shorter term impact.  The U.S. Constitution amplifies the weight of 
agriculture by giving two senatorial seats to every U.S. State.  The 23 U.S. States with farm products sales 
representing a share of the Gross State Product larger than the share for the entire U.S. economy are 
represented by 46 senators, whereas they represent only 24 percent of the Gross State Product of all the 
U.S. States – a huge over-representation. 3/  The constraint did not play any role until the Uruguay Round 
simply because liberalization in agriculture was not on the agenda and because the Uruguay Round did not 
generate substantial tariff or subsidy cuts in agriculture.  But as long as farm tariff and subsidy cuts will be 
major issues of negotiations, it is likely to play a crucial role. 
The EC constitutional regime is a strong handicap to an EC significant leadership in multilateral trade 
negotiations.  The EC is a collective decision-maker, with the majority rule as the most frequent decision 
process in case of trade in goods.  However, this majority rule faces a severe limit.  Everytime a topic is of 
critical importance for a Member State, the Member State can exert an indirect veto, by threatening to use its 
veto rights in the other issues which continue to be subjected to consensus (internal taxation, for instance).  
As the EC enlargements are likely to expand the range of trade issues of critical importance (it would be 
surprizing that the new Member States do not bring “their” own critical trade agenda) they are likely to reduce 
the EC capacity to take initiatives in multilateral trade negotiations, or at least to slow it down, in order to find 
the time necessary to strike a deal on intra-EC trade-offs capable to unlock the EC trade strategy [Messerlin 
2007]. 
Increasingly Thin Majorities 
Economic analysis shows that trade is beneficial for a country as a whole, but is detrimental to certain people 
in the country.  It thus provides an explanation to an apparent paradox – the multi-secular push towards freer 
trade, and the permanently re-emerging opposition to it.  But it also raises another paradox which has 
attracted surprizingly little attention so far.  At the beginning of the post-War liberalization process of the 
industrial countries – from the 1950s to the 1970s – import-competing vested interests were large compared 
to export lobbies, because export sectors are initially embryonic and import-competing sectors cover a vast 
range of products.  However, despite the unfavorable balance of domestic forces during these years, 
governments were able to generate a momentum in favor of trade liberalization.  4/ 
In sharp contrast, today developed countries are characterized by smaller import-competing sectors, often 
routinely adjusting to foreign competitors, and by wider and strong export interests.  As a result, a smoother 
ride towards freer trade should thus be expected.  This is not the case.  Today, further trade liberalization is 
slow to progress in most developed countries. 
 
2 /President H. Truman was able to conlcude three GATT Rounds, and President D. Eisenhower two Rounds.  The Kennedy Round was 
the first to be launched, but it was concluded by his successor (L. Johnson) who was Vice-President during the Kennedy Presidency.  
The Tokyo Round was the first to involve two Presidents from different parties (G. Ford, a Republican, and J. Carter, a Democrat) while 
the Uruguay Round lasted three Presidencies (R. Reagan, G.H. Bush, two Republicans, and W. Clinton, a Democrat). 
3  /These 23 U.S. States do not include six States (California, Texas, Illinois, Georgia, Florida, Ohio, Michigan and Pennsylvania) which 
have the largest farm output in the U.S., but which have GSP farm shares smaller than the share for the entire U.S. economy.  The EC 
exhibits a relatively similar feature [Messerlin 2007]. 
4 /Introducing “political” weights for sectors which would counterbalance their size effect (as done in the literature) “solves” the problem, 
but without explaining the nature and the emergence of such political factors. 
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Why such a slowing down?  A first potential culprit could be the lack of interests from the export sectors, and, 
more generally, from the business community of the developed countries.  But, if this community has been 
slow to enter the debate of the Doha Round (an attitude quite easy to understand when confronted to the 
confused debates of the WTO negotiators) it has been very active since a couple of years [International 
Chamber of Commerce 2007, UNICE 2007, National Association of Manufacturers 2007].  A second potential 
culprit could be the peoples of the industrial countries, and their loss of appetite for freer trade.  But, recent 
polls show quite the contrary – a strong support for international trade in the public opinion of the U.S. and in 
the EC (on average 70 percent) [German Marshall Fund 2006].  A third potential culprit could be vested 
interests opposed to freer trade, tiny but well organized and strong [Baldwin 2006].  But, strong and tiny 
(“striny”) lobbies are not a new story in trade matters.  The less than 30,000 U.S. cotton farms and 25,000 EC 
banana farms echo the candlestick makers so eloquently described by Bastiat [1845] some 150 years ago. 
The erosion of the permissive consensus in favor of freer trade that occurred during the two last decades 
requires thus a better explanation.  A convincing candidate is the increasingly thin majorities in the major 
industrial democracies since the late 1980s.  Thinner majorities grant to the striny vested interests a power 
increasingly out of proportion with their real importance, suffocating the huge support among the people and 
business for freer trade. 
Graphs 1 to 4 illustrate the evolution of the governing majorities in the four largest founding GATT Members 
since the 1950s.  They focus on majority margins, that is, the ratio of the winners in the examined elections 
over the loosers, independently from which political party is the winner.  They focus on the elections that are 
the most crucial from a trade perspective.  
U.S. presidential elections are crucial for trade policy since it is the President who takes the initiative in trade 
negotiations – first by consulting trading partners, then by deciding to go to Congress for getting approval for 
launching formal negotiations, lastly by tabling a package acceptable to Congress.  Since the mid-1980s, the 
decline in the presidential majorities has been phenomenal among the electoral voters who are the key ones 
under U.S. Constitution.  The ratio of the votes in favor of the elected President to those for the losing 
candidate has collapsed by 45 percentage points, with all-time lows in 2000 and 2004.  The corresponding 
ratio in the American people’s votes has also substantially declined (by 8 percentage points). 
One also notes a steady and substantial decline in the majority margins at the House of Representatives 
(often considered by the U.S. trade observers as the most important of the two Chambers in terms of trade 
policy).  This decline has begun earlier (late 1970s) than in the presidential elections.  The majority margins at 
the Senate follows the same pattern, albeit in a more moderate manner. 
French presidential elections are also the key ones in trade policy because the President plays a dominant 
role in foreign policy matters (his “domaine réservé”).  These elections consist in two runs (“tours”) with the 
two best placed candidates in the first tour being the only ones allowed to run in the second tour.  Since 1988, 
the first tour shows a decline of the votes for the best placed candidate, compared to those in favor of the 
second best placed candidate. 5/  But, the best sense of the real political strength of an elected President is 
given by the votes supporting him in the first tour compared to all the French votes because this ratio captures 
the relative size of the core supporters of the elected president.  The ratio has dramatically (by 25 percentage 
points) and continuously decreased since the first direct presidential election in 1965. 
 
5 /The second tours do not show a very clear evolution because they reflect loose coalitions of voters.  In 2002, the second tour was 
atypical.  It opposed the remaining conservative candidate, J. Chirac, to the extreme-right candidate, J.M. Le Pen.  As a result, the “left” 
votes have little possibility other than to vote for Mr. J. Chirac. 
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Graph 1. Increasingly thin majorities in the US Presidential elections
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Graph 2. Increasingly thin majorities in the French Presidential elections
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Graph 1bis.  Increasingly thin majorities in the US Congress
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Graph 3. Increasingly thin majorities in the German Bundestag elections
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
A
de
na
ue
r
19
49
A
de
na
ue
r
19
53
A
de
na
ue
r
19
57
A
de
na
ue
r
19
61
Ki
es
in
ge
r
19
65
Br
an
dt
 1
96
9
Br
an
dt
 1
97
2
Br
an
dt
 1
97
6
S
ch
m
id
t 1
98
0
K
oh
l 1
98
3
K
oh
l 1
98
7
K
oh
l 1
99
0
K
oh
l 1
99
4
S
ch
ro
ed
er
19
98
S
ch
ro
ed
er
20
02
M
er
ke
l 2
00
5
W
in
ne
r's
 v
ot
es
, %
 o
f v
ot
es
 fo
r t
he
 tw
o 
le
ad
in
g 
ca
nd
id
at
es
Graph 4. Increasingly thin majorities in the U.K House of Commons elections 
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In Germany, the crucial elections are those for the Bundestag (the Lower House).  Looking at votes or seats 
does not make a difference because the German electoral system allocates seats proportionally to votes 
according to a complex procedure aiming at eliminating too small parties.  Since the late 1980s, there is a 
noticeable erosion in the share of seats of the winning party, compared to the seats of the loosing party – 
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leading all the German governments since 1969 to rely on “small” coalitions 6/.  In 2005, this ongoing erosion 
went as far as to require a recourse to a “grand coalition” of the two largest parties (CDU-CSU and Social 
Democrats). 7/  That said, the best illustration of the erosion of the majorities in Germany is the decreasing 
ratio of the winning largest party (whichever it is) in the total German votes expressed.  This ratio has declined 
by 14 percentage points between its last highest peak (1983) and 2005. 
At a first glance, the United Kingdom seems a strong exception to our working hypothesis.  Far to decline, 
British winning majorities have an increasing share of votes since the mid-1970s, although there is some 
signs of erosion since 1983.  This impression is amplified when one looks at seats – not a big surprise since 
the British electoral procedure gives a huge seat premium to the election winners.  However, all these 
observations hide an opposite evolution, that is the noticeable decline (by almost 10 percentage points) of the 
wining party in the total amount of British votes.  (This is due to the increasing number of votes in favor of a 
third party which has never been able to get a noticeable number of seats.)  This increasing gap between the 
majority in the House of Commons and the situation in the country has a cost.  It requires a careful handling 
by the reigning Prime Minister, hence imposes an increasing limit to its full authority. 
 
Don’t count on leadership? 
Very little – if anything – can be done for changing constitutional rules.  Indeed, when proposed, changes 
generally tend to shorten presidential mandates rather than to lengthen them, as best illustrated by the 
change in the French Constitution shortening the presidential mandate from seven to five years (starting in 
2002).  Such changes happen to be counter-productive from a trade perspective because shorter mandates 
make more difficult for a President to support freer trade liberalization which is generally characterized by 
fast-emerging costs and late-coming benefits.  Similarly, it is hard to see how to deal with the issue of 
increasingly thin majorities without endangering the basic functioning of democracies.  Indeed, it would be 
important to understand the reasons behind this evolution in modern industrial democracies in order to have a 
sense whether it is a long term phenomenon (triggered by higher income enlarging the possibilities of 
society’s goals, hence fragmenting the opinion) or a transitory change subjected to rapid reversals. 
In a nutshell, the current lack of leadership is here for a long time.  Of course, visionary and courageous 
leaders could emerge at any point in the future, and make a difference.  But it would be foolish to count on 
them.  The period where trade Rounds were shorter than U.S. Presidential mandates, with the U.S. as the 
natural and benevolent hegemon, seems over. 
Combined with the increasingly number of WTO Members, this lack of leadership seems to many observers 
to condemn the WTO to enter a long coma period, already illustrated by the permanent difficulties faced by 
the Doha Round since 2001, and that bilateral trade agreements are the only remaining solution.  Section 2 
looks at this point. 
II. How Strong Are The Winds of Bilateralism? 
Supporters of an increasing recourse to preferential trade agreements (PTAs) see their views justified by the 
increasing number of PTAs concluded since the 1990s – culminating to more than 200 PTAs notified to the 
WTO as of September 2006.  This figure is so often quoted, its weight in the WTO debate is so heavy that it 
deserves attention before turning to substance. 
 
 
6 /The coalitions were as follows: CDU-CSU with the Free Democrats (1969-1982), the Social Democrats with the Free Democrats (1982-
1998) and then with the Greens (1998-2005).  The CDU-CSU is itself a coalition of the Christian Democrats and the Christian Social 
Union (CSU).  The CSU is based in one key German State (Bavaria) characterized by a strong farm lobby.  The CSU votes are crucial 
since they represent, on average, 20 percent of the total votes for the CDU-CSU coalition when the coalition is governing (21.4 percent in 
the 2005 elections). 
7 /There was a first “grand coalition” experience from 1966 to 1969. 
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A. Little Bit of Accounting 8/ 
The following sentence (written three decades ago) introduces some immediate caution in the current belief of 
a PTA boom as a new phenomenon:  “The U.S. draftsmen of the ITO Charter did not foresee that post-World 
War II commercial policy would be dominated by the rise of a multitude of regional agreements which would 
challenge the draftsmen’s universal principles in the most fundamental manner” [Dam 1970, own underline].  
Keeping this in mind, Figure 1 shows that the 200 plus PTAs figure gives a seriously exaggerated and 
misleading view of the recent attraction for PTAs. 
Firstly, this figure still includes a very substantial proportion (more than 30 percent in the most recent years) of 
intra-European trade agreements (defined as deals between countries located in the European continent, 
excluding Belarus, Russia and Ukraine).  The large number 
Figure 1. How to count PTAs?
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of intra-European deals mirrors the inefficient way (from a purely institutional point of view) Europeans are 
building their Single Market.  Any trade deal negotiated by the EC generates almost mechanically “clone” 
deals by the EFTA countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.  As a result, every time the EC trade policy 
changes, a vast number of bilaterals can disappear (as when ten Central European countries joined the EC in 
2004, or when the 27 PTAs between the Balkan countries were replaced by one deal under the EC aegis, as 
decided December 19, 2006) or emerge (for instance, if the EC decides to implement the new policy of 
bilaterals outlined in 2006 by the Commission, see below). 
Secondly, the increase in the number of PTAs notified to the WTO reflects somewhat the increase in WTO 
membership (for instance, a substantial number of bilaterals involve former Soviet Union republics which have 
recently acceded to the WTO).  Figure 1 “deflates” the (increasing) number of PTAs by the (increasing) 
number of WTO Members.  The “deflated” number of PTAs shows a much more modest increase of PTAs – 
one-fourth of the unadjusted increase. 
Lastly, the few pre-1995 PTAs listed in the WTO 2006 database do not include the PTAs which were 
negotiated before 1995, but which did not survive, hence are not recorded in 2006. 
In short, simple accounting misses the key question – how many of the current 200 PTAs will survive?  
Answering this question requires to make a difference between PTAs focusing on market access (which tend 
to survive) and those looking after trade preferences (which tend to fail) for reasons shown in the coming sub-
section. 
                                                 
8 /For similar observations, see Pomfret 2006. 
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B. The Perpetual Rise and Fall of Preferences 
Contrary to unilateral or multilateral liberalization, economic analysis is at pain to provide a clear answer 
about the net benefits of bilateral trade liberalization [Schiff and Winters 2003].  For most of the economists, 
bilaterals constitute a second best solution in a vast majority of the cases – and a second best can be far 
away from the first best.  Available evidence confirms the economists’ dominant view by suggesting a bad 
performance of bilaterals in opening new markets.  They are credited for only 10 percent of the world market 
opening having occurred between 1983 and 2003, compared to 65 percent for unilateral liberalization, and 25 
percent for WTO-based liberalization [World Bank 2005]. 
Such a bad performance is not surprizing for the pre-1990s bilaterals which mostly involved countries 
enforcing high tariffs on imports from the rest of the world (hereafter, “erga omnes” tariffs).  In such a case, 
the two signatories grant to each other high “preferences” (defined as the differences between erga omnes 
and preferential tariffs).  High preferences distort trade flows because they induce consumers to buy goods 
from inefficient production sources located in the two countries rather than goods more efficiently produced in 
the rest of the world.  The higher the erga omnes tariffs (hence preferences) are, the more distorted the 
bilateral trade flows may be, the higher the costs of the bilateral (compared to a multilateral liberalization) may 
be for the consumers of the products imported from the trading partner, the higher the likelihood of the 
bilateral collapse is. 
If the EC, the EFTA and the NAFTA countries have escaped this fate, it is largely because many erga omnes 
common external European tariffs have been moderate since the very early years.  It is also because the EC 
integration has been immersed in an almost permanent multilateral liberalization process – only 14 out of the 
36 years between the EC launch and the end of the Uruguay Round (1995) have not witnessed GATT Round 
negotiations.  During the first years of the EC, this immersion has made easier for EC Member States to 
compromise on lower external tariffs, and afterwards, it has helped the EC trading partners to reduce the risks 
of an EC “fortress”. 
Since the late 1980s, many countries have lowered their erga omnes tariffs.  Logically, that should have 
triggered a loss of interest in bilaterals for two reasons:  lower erga omnes tariffs generate reduced 
preferences; and they subject the pre-existing bilaterals to a painful “erosion” of the initially granted 
preferences. 9/ 
How thus can one explain the continuing attraction to bilaterals in a world with more moderate average 
applied erga omnes tariffs?  Firstly, it may simply reflect that tariff cuts made since the late 1980s are far-to-
perfect.  They have been made on a wide range of products, but high tariffs and/or non-tariff barriers have 
been kept on a substantial range of goods, hence ensuring high preferences for the non-liberalized products. 
Secondly, most tariff cuts of the two last decades have been done in terms of applied tariffs, not of “bound” 
tariffs.  Under WTO rules, only bound tariffs cannot be raised without compensating the affected trading 
partners (hence the importance of the WTO negotiations on bound tariffs, see section 3).  Today bilaterals 
may then offer limited preferences on applied tariffs, but still offer high preferences on bound tariffs, hence 
shifting the risk of tariff increases to the countries without preferential market access. 
Lastly, the two last decades have witnessed a shift of interest towards trade in services (as shown by Table 1 
below) freer international investment flows.  The current WTO framework is at pain for addressing these 
issues.  It is loosely structured with respect of services liberalization, it has a minimal set of provisions on 
investment in services, and none in goods.  Moreover, when including all its 150 members, the WTO does not 
offer the level of trust that negotiating liberalisation in services and investment does require (see section 3). 
 
That said, bilaterals on trade in services and investments may be attractive for the same reason that the pre-
1990s bilaterals on trade in goods were:  the existence of high preferences.  Hence they may be doomed to 
the same fate since today, most services are highly protected in most countries, as it was the case for goods 
 
9 /For instance, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the EC signed new bilaterals with the Central European economies, breaking up the 
existing ranking of preferences among its partners in bilaterals (most of them being developing or least developed countries).  The 
political strains of this evolution were so heavy that, in 1997, the Community decided a “pause” in its policy on bilaterals.  It renounced to 
envisage new bilaterals and decided only to conclude the already ongoing negotiations – succeeding with Chile and Mexico, but failing to 
do so with Mercosur. 
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before the 1990s. 10/  The magnitude of this problem depends on whether discriminatory practices are hard to 
embed in services and investments bilaterals [Roy, Marchetti and Lim 2006] or not. 
C.  The Current Pattern of PTAs 
Table 1 suggests a few key features of the current PTA situation. 11/  Firstly, the PTAs notified during the 
WTO years (post-1995) are almost exclusively bilateral trade agreements (hereafter “bilaterals”) in sharp 
contrast with those notified during the GATT years (pre-1995) which are almost equally split between regional 
trade agreements and bilaterals. 12/ This conclusion is reinforced by the clear drift from customs union to free 
trade areas between the two periods.  As well known, the trade liberalization brought by free trade areas are 
severely limited by the use of complex rules of origin, compared to those in the case of customs unions. 
Secondly, the breakdown of the non intra-European PTas presents large countries as followers in the recent 
PTAs wave, rather than as leaders, in sharp contrast to what is widely believed. 13/  There is no bilateral 
between the top 10 economies (defined as those having the 10 largest GDPs, including those of the individual 
EC Member States, under PPP-based exchange rates).  And there are only half-a-dozen of bilaterals 
combining a top 10 and a top 20 economy (in fact, they consist in only three “pairs” of countries, with an 
agreement in trade in goods coupled with an agreement in trade in services, that is, U.S.-Australia, Japan-
Mexico and Thailand-Australia). 
Table 1.  Preferential trade agreements notified to the WTO from 1958 to 2006, as of September 2006
All GATT WTO All GATT WTO
years years years years years years
PTAs by type and activity
Regional vs. bilateral PTAs 211 50 161 100.0 100.0 100.0
regional trade agreements 36 26 10 17.1 52.0 6.2
bilateral trade agreements ("bilaterals") 175 24 151 82.9 48.0 93.8
PTAs on trade in goods and on trade in services 211 50 161 100.0 100.0 100.0
Trade in goods:  customs unions 8 5 3 3.8 10.0 1.9
Trade in goods:  f\ree trade areas 165 44 121 78.2 88.0 75.2
Trade in services 38 1 37 18.0 2.0 23.0
PTAs by type of signatories 211 50 161 100.0 100.0 100.0
Intra-European deals [a] 65 19 46 30.8 38.0 28.6
Deals with no signatory among the top 20 economies 35 5 30 16.6 10.0 18.6
Non intra-European bilaterals 146 31 115 69.2 62.0 71.4
Breakdown of the non intra-European bilaterals 146 31 115 100.0 100.0 100.0
Bilaterals with one signatory among the top 10 economies 51 6 41 34.9 19.4 35.7
Bilaterals with the U.S. 17 3 14 11.6 9.7 12.2
Bilaterals with the EC 20 2 18 13.7 6.5 15.7
Bilaterals with one signatory among the 11-20 largest economies 34 1 33 23.3 3.2 28.7
Bilaterals with both signatories among the top 20 economies [b] 6 0 6 4.1 -- 5.2
Bilaterals with no signatory among the top 20 economies 32 2 30 21.9 6.5 26.1
Source:  WTO notifications, WTO website. IMF data on GDP at PPP exchange rates.
Notes [a] Trade deals within the European continent (includes the EC, EFTA, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, see text).
[b] There is no bilaterals with both signatories among the top 10 economies.
Number of agreements Shares (in %)
 
In addition, one third of the bilaterals involve a top 10 economy with a “small” economy (defined as an 
economy not among the top 20 economies).  The role of the U.S. and the EC is relatively limited, with the EC 
slightly ahead of the U.S. (a remark useful when assessing the possible U-turn in the EC trade policy in terms 
of bilaterals).  In relative terms, the top 11-20 economies have been more active during the last ten years. 
The mirror image of these observations is the large share of the small countries in the recent wave of 
bilaterals, echoing the long queue of Trade Ministers willing to negotiate a bilateral with the U.S. or the EC at 
the sudden end of the WTO Cancun Ministerial, though many of these Ministers were much vocal on the risks 
                                                 
10 /For instance, questions are raised about the real impact of intra-European bilaterals [Aslund 2006]. 
11/Table 1 includes the agreements between the EC and the African-Caribbean-Pacific countries by counting the ACP regional PTAs. 
12 /The change is underestimated by Table 1 to the extent that seven (out of the 10) regional agreements signed during the WTO years 
are related to the EC trade policy with respect to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, and may not have existed in the absence 
of this policy.  The fading of regional agreements reinforces the conclusion reached in Figure 1 according to which the mere accounting 
of PTAs magnifies grossly their recent economic impact. 
13 /Intra-European deals are definitively shaped by the EC trade policy 
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of liberalization a few hours before.  Annex 1 offers reasons for the dominance of the small countries in the 
recent increase of bilaterals. 
D. The 2006 EC Initiative:  Launching a Race to Bilaterals? 14/ 
In November 2006, Peter Mandelson, the EC Trade Commissioner, released a working document spelling out 
the various options for Europe’s trade policy for the coming years [European Commission 2006].  The 
document reaffirms the support to the Doha negotiations.  But, it develops such a massive European strategy 
in terms of future bilaterals – no less than 24 bilaterals are envisaged – with such a sense of urgent need for 
action that it has left the strong impression of a change of course in European trade strategy if the Council 
decides to follow the Commission’s proposal.  The document was rather coolly received at the European 
Parliament, and it has not convinced a large share of the European business community about the need to go 
on the bilateral track [Wallenberg 2006, Seillière 2006].  Since then, the Commission has tried to minimize the 
initial impression of haste – almost panic – without much success.  But, at the same time, it is pushing hard 
the Member States’ Trade Ministries to start as quickly as possible feasibility studies. 
The Commission’s document suggests that Europe is late in an allegedly ongoing race to bilaterals, hence 
that it should “catch up”.  Such an assumption is not supported by evidence.  Table 1 shows that Europe is 
still – by far – the most important source of bilaterals (a point confirmed by Table 2 below).  The second most 
important source of bilaterals are small economies, as shown above, and this is unlikely to threaten severely 
European trade flows. 
The Commission’s fears seem to be caused by the fact that, during the recent years, the U.S. has seemed to 
have the bilaterals game all to itself.  This perception is not supported by Table 1 which shows that U.S.-
related bilaterals represent only 14 percent of all the post-1990 bilaterals notified to the WTO (a result 
reinforced by Table 2  based on the size of the bilaterals in question, see below).  In addition, there is little 
evidence of an U.S. strategic approach in terms of bilaterals.  The U.S. Administration has taken few 
initiatives in terms of bilaterals (with Australia, Bahrain, Morocco) and these initiatives were fundamentally 
driven by foreign policy motives (the Irak war).  In contrast to the Commission’s approach, the U.S. has no 
pending “grand vision” in terms of bilaterals.  The Free Trade Area for the Americas looks a sleeping beauty, 
the U.S. calls for an Asian Pacific initiative are incantatory but inconsequential, while the China-U.S. dialogue 
will most probably reduce the current trade flows between Asia and the U.S., be via exchange rate 
adjustments by Asian trading partners or via U.S. retaliatory measures.  Lastly, the ordeals to get the recent 
bilaterals approved by the U.S. Congress and the mood of the newly elected Congress (revealed by the 
request to review of the bilaterals asked by the new Democrat majority) do not suggest that strategic changes 
are on the agenda. 
In such a context, the Commission’s aggressive approach could trigger precisely what the Commission fears 
– a race to bilaterals – to the extent that the Commission’s proposal may push the U.S. and other large 
trading partners to “catch up” in terms of bilaterals. 
There is thus a strong need to go beyond impressions and intents by providing a few indicators showing what 
has been recently effectively achieved in terms of bilaterals and what could be achieved if the ongoing 
negotiations and those envisaged are concluded.  However, what follows does not attempt to do the usual 
economic analysis – that is, to estimate the net economic gains from bilaterals.  Such estimates are 
notoriously difficult, but, above all, they are subjected to strong limits that their results are easily flawed.  For 
instance, they assume that the two signatories of a bilateral will dismantle their respective trade barriers, and 
that the resulting situation will last for a long time.  As suggested above, they are many reasons to seriously 
doubt about these premises. 
 
When assessing the current and expected bilaterals, the crucial objective is to make the difference between 
bilaterals focusing on market opening (likely to be a stepping stone to world trade liberalization) and those 
focusing on market preferences (likely to be a stumbling stone to world liberalisation).  Table 2 presents 
simple but useful evidence in this respect.  It focuses on the EC and the U.S., but, in order to provide a richer 
perspective, it includes a small economy (Chile) which is the world most active signatory of bilaterals, as 
shown by column 1 which gives the number of co-signatories of the bilaterals involving these three countries. 
 
14 /This sub-section relies heavily on Messerlin [2007]. 
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Columns 2 and 3 give the GDP shares of the three countries’ trading partners in the world GDP (both at 
current and PPP exchange rates) give a sense of the market coverage of the possible preferences related to 
the size of the trading partners involved in the existing and future bilaterals negotiated by the three countries 
in question.  Combining the coverage indicator with indicators focusing on the level of preferences gives a 
sense of the magnitude (that is, the coverage times the level) of the expected preferences.  Columns 2 and 3 
reveal a striking difference between the EC and the U.S. on the one hand, and Chile on the other for the 
bilaterals enforced and signed.  The EC and U.S. bilaterals cover a very low share of world GDP, whereas 
Chile’s bilaterals cover almost three quarters of the world GDP (ten times more than the EC and U.S. 
coverage).  Looking at the bilaterals under negotiation or consideration changes dramatically the picture.  The 
Commission’s aggressive approach is launching a real race to bilaterals, with the risk that the U.S. could react 
with its own aggressive strategy. 
 
Table 2: Bilaterals:  Three Strategies
Number
of at at trading dealing ease of regis- protec-
partners current PPP applied bound across with doing tering ting
USD USD borders licences business property investors
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A.  Bilaterals signed
Chile 20 79.0 70.4 5.5 8.0 34.1 70.8 41.5 39.6 46.3
USA 15 7.6 6.5 7.5 19.6 42.9 41.9 29.2 50.1 34.0
EC 14 [d] 6.4 8.2 9.2 18.3 76.8 91.9 67.1 80.4 53.4
B.  Bilaterals under negotiations or consideration
Chile 9 [e] 81.6 77.7 6.4 10.3 43.2 77.8 49.4 45.5 45.1
USA 14 14.9 16.5 8.8 21.3 54.1 69.7 52.2 64.7 44.2
EC 24 23.4 44.2 10.3 17.8 71.1 125.6 91.2 61.8 64.8
[a] GDP (in USD, 2004) as a share of world GDP.  [b] WTO Trade Profiles. [c] Doing Business 2007.
[d] Counting as one the 10 countries having acceded to the EC in 2004.   [e] Counting as one the EC.
Market size [a] Average industrial Regulatory ranking [c]
tariff [b]
 
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 focus on tariffs, the first key instrument that could determine the level of 
preferences in trade in goods.  Low applied average tariffs suggest that partners in the bilaterals have kept 
relatively few peak tariffs, hence that they offer limited opportunities for preferences, while such opportunities 
are likely in the case of high applied tariffs (and the same can be said for high bound tariffs).  Columns 4 and 
5 reveal another striking difference between the EC and the US on the one hand, and Chile on the other hand 
– for both the existing and envisaged bilaterals.  The average applied and bound tariffs of the EC and of the 
U.S. co-signatories are relatively high, they are low in the case of Chile’s bilaterals.  In other words, the EC 
and the U.S. are, volens nolens, looking for tariff preferences – perhaps “nolens” in the U.S. bilaterals since 
the U.S. has been mostly a follower, clearly “volens” in the proposed EC strategy. 
Columns 6 and 7 of Table 2 focus on non-tariff barriers, the other key instrument that could determine the 
level of preferences in trade in goods.  As there is no direct measure of such barriers, Table 2 relies on the 
ranking of the co-signatories of the EC, the U.S. and Chile in two respects – the ease of trading across 
borders and the ease of dealing with licences as estimated by the Doing Business database [Doing Business 
2006].  Ranks are crude indicators (there may be a much bigger difference between the first and second rank 
than between the second and third rank, or vice-versa).  However, averaging the ranks of the EC, U.S. and 
Chile co-signatories show differences which are large enough to be meaningful.  Columns 6 and 7 suggest 
that by far the EC is the WTO Member which focuses the most on co-signatories having high non-tariff 
barriers, particularly with its recent strategy – once again, suggesting the intent to look for market 
preferences. 
Column 8 to 10 of Table 2 are attempts to deal with services and investments.  They also rely on ranks 
provided by the Doing Business database.  The services dimension is captured by the global indicator of the 
ease of doing business in the various co-signatories, whereas the investment dimension is reflected by the 
quality of property registering and of investors protection in the co-signatory.  Once again, these three 
indicators oppose the EC on the one hand, and Chile and the U.S. on the other hand.  The EC tends to look 
at markets highly protected by inefficient regulations – hence potentially offering high preferences – whereas 
the two others are more attracted by countries having relatively sound regulations.  Market preferences are a 
mix blessing:  it may be useful to get them if other large trading partners do (but this is definitively not yet the 
case with the countries targeted by the Commission, contrary to what the Commission suggests) but they can 
also create costly trade distortions generating negative dynamics of preference erosion tensions and risk of 
collapse of the bilaterals in question. 
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All the results for the EC are largely, but not exclusively, driven by four targeted countries, namely Brazil, 
China, India and Russia.  Table 2 assumes that this strategy is meaningful, that is, that the bilaterals to be 
concluded are delivering a real trade liberalization in the EC co-signatories – an assumption far to be granted 
in the case of bilaterals with “not-so-small” countries (see Annex 1).  Moreover, these four countries are not 
especially known for being easy partners to negotiate with.  One really wonders what the EC could get in a 
bilateral setting that it could not get in the WTO forum by forgeing an alliance with other countries. 
III. “Flexiplining” the WTO 
Since bilaterals are far to be the panacea, the WTO remains the main road to go.  But, a “quick fix” limited to 
a relaunch of the WTO negotiations (be in 2007 or in 2009) without a serious effort to reshape the WTO 
negotiating process is almost certain to get minimal results.  And these results could be welfare-deteriorating 
because of the distortions introduced by the many exceptions envisaged by the negotiators, and by the 
economically unsound instruments to which the negotiators may have recourse for implementing these 
exceptions (such as tariff-rate quotas).  So far, there has been scant attention for making such an effort, if one 
excepts two decisions adopted at the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial but still fruitless for reasons explained 
below.  Indeed, the four-years long Doha discussions on “negotiating modalities” have gone in the opposite 
direction, making the WTO negotiating process more confused and inefficient, hence making the fortune of 
the bilaterals. 
The section argues that there are many possible sources of increased efficiency in the WTO negotiating 
process.  It argues that the current process is prisoner of interpretations which have been shaped a long time 
ago (and were often very useful then) but which are harmful today, and can be challenged while fully abiding 
by the WTO principles. 
The section highlights six sources of efficiency which have one common goal – shooting at shorter Rounds.  
All these sources would help to conclude faster WTO Rounds.  They are self-reinforcing, a characteristic 
allowing to use each of them more “gently”, a favorable feature for achieving compromises.  They aim at 
“flexiplining” the WTO process, that is, on the one hand at disciplining it – by focusing on the core business of 
market access and by relying on formulas for negotiating market access in goods – and on the other hand at 
making it more flexible – by re-assessing the value of binding tariffs, by relying on plurilaterals for negotiating 
market access in services, by re-interpreting the Single Undertaking principle, and by mellowing the bilaterals 
via some multilateralisation of their rules of origin.  An important side effect of these improvements would be 
to reduce the attraction for bilaterals in general (and bilaterals focused on market preferences in particular) 
and to make the current and future bilaterals more friendly to the multilateral trade regime. 
Before examining these points, the usual medicine recommended today – a stricter use of GATT Article XXIV 
for monitoring the bilaterals – deserves a comment.  Although useful, this medicine has no capacity (nor 
claim, to be fair) to relaunch the WTO negotiations, and it has very little chance to have an impact on the 
proliferation of the bilaterals.  This is because it should rely on GATT Article XXIV for trade in goods which 
has won the hard-to-win qualification of being “deceptive” and “based on a legal error” [Dam 1970] and on its 
equally cryptic twin GATS Article V for trade in services.  Years of negotiations will be needed for agreeing on 
a common interpretation of such deceptive provisions and of their stricter use.  In short, the medicine may be 
operational too late – once the damage will be done, that is, after that too many PTAs will have been 
negotiated and enforced. 
 
E. Shooting for Shorter Rounds 
Having shorter Rounds is not a new idea, but so far, it has been justified by unconvincing reasons.  First is 
negotiators’ fatigue.  But negotiators have fixed term assignments in the diplomatic traditions of many 
countries, and the alternative – a race to bilaterals – will be much more demanding for the negotiators, as well 
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as for the politicians, the businessmen, and the people.  Secondly, it is often said that bilaterals are fast to be 
negotiated, but anecdotal evidence does not support such an assertion. 15/ 
Shooting for shorter Rounds has a much firmer ground when one takes the domestic political constraints 
examined in section 1 (particularly in the U.S., the most important WTO player) and the erosion of the 
permissive consensus in favor of freer trade caused by increasingly thin majorities in the major industrial 
democracies.  Ideally, no Round should last more than 6-7 years, mirroring the constraint on U.S. Presidents.  
Shorter Rounds mean more limited objectives for each Round.  It is often argued in WTO circles that limited 
targets (a “Round light”) is the death of kiss in domestic trade politics, especially in the U.S. Congress.  There 
is a lot of rhetoric in this view, but not a lot of evidence supporting it.  In 1994, the Congress passed the 
Uruguay Round that had a limited trade liberalization component per se, but that has also offered long term 
perspectives of liberalization.  More limited Rounds require to be cast in a sequence of Rounds, and to turn 
the back to the always deceptive concept of the “Big Last One”.  A sequence of Rounds has many 
advantages.  In particular, it would smooth domestic concerns about high adjustment costs of the agreed 
liberalistaion, a key point for both developed and developing countries.  And it would have the huge 
advantage of making the WTO better able to “catch up” in services liberalisation by multilateralising more 
often bilaterals in services (see below). 
 
F. The WTO Should Focus on its Core Business:  Market Access 
The WTO should focus on its core business:  market access in goods and services.  It should not be 
burdened by other issues which, sooner or later, have to be abandoned.  The unceremonious overboard 
throwing of three Singapore issues at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial has shown the heavy cost of such 
miscalculations for the WTO as a whole, and for the EC, its staunchest supporter, in particular. 
Industrial countries have generally justified the introduction of issues other than market access by arguing that 
they have nothing left to offer in terms of market access concessions.  This argument ignores a basic point:  
most remaining tariffs of industrial countries target the exports from developing countries [Laird 2002].  The 
high tariffs imposed by the industrial countries on their imports of manufacturing products may be few, but 
their economic value for developing countries’ exporters is huge.  The same can be said for industrial 
countries’ agricultural protection:  it inhibits the growth of a critical sector for developing countries – 
particularly for the poorest ones – even if the importance of agriculture will fade away as and when these 
countries will grow.  Last but not least, this argument ignores the universe of services largely untouched, 
although it represents 70 percent of rich countries’ GDP and it is of prime interest for most WTO Members.  In 
short, there are still plenty of deals about market access to be done. 
The best way to eliminate topics not closely related to market access is to deal with them in a better place 
than the WTO.  This is particularly important for international investment because of the intrinsic importance 
of this topic, and because it has fuelled the recent move to bilateralism via bilateral investment treaties or via 
investment provisions in bilateral trade agreements [OECD 2006a, 2006b].  The WTO is badly equiped to 
multilateralize investment bilaterals.  The GATT text has no rule on international investment in goods, and the 
GATS text only general provisions.  The OECD has lost its chance to host a worldwide agreement on 
investment because it mismanaged the last attempt to design such an agreement [Henderson 1999] and 
because it has a too narrow membership.  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has the appropriate 
membership, most of the needed expertise, and, last but not least, a need to redefine its role.  The IMF 
(perhaps with the Bank of International Settlements) should thus waste no time for launching an initiative 
aiming at establishing a multilateral investment framework – undercutting any velleity of the WTO negotiators 
to grab the issue, especially if they feel jobless in the case of an indefinite suspension of the Doha Round. 
 
15 /It is impossible to compare the negotiating time required by bilaterals and by WTO negotiations because of the high variability of the 
trade content of bilaterals.  Vague provisions in bilaterals may indicate the absence of real commitments, or, alternatively, they may 
reflect a “neo-imperial” aspect, particularly if they deal with basic principles (as often in the EC-related bilaterals). 
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G. Market Access in Goods:  Using the Swiss Formula for “Peeling the Onion” 
At the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, after four years of endless discussions on negotiating “modalities”, the 
Doha negotiators have agreed, almost in despair, to use the Swiss formula for trade in industrial products 
(NAMA).  16/ 
This was a huge step forward which should be adopted permanently because the Swiss formula is an 
instrument of liberalization both extremely efficient and flexible.  From an economic perspective, it cuts tariff 
peaks by more than the smaller tariffs, hence maximizing the economic benefits from trade liberalization, and 
improving tariff revenues for countries needing this source of public revenue.  From a domestic political 
economy perspective, it puts more pressure on the high tariff beneficiaries, but it reduces the pressure on the 
low tariff sectors, hence offering to governments the opportunity to mobilize the support of the large number of 
moderately protected sectors against the few highly protected.  In addition, it moves protection toward a 
greater neutrality of protection across goods – a key feature helpful for addressing the touchy binding issue 
(see below).  From a negotiating perspective, the formula offers, for any Swiss coefficient envisaged, instant 
and costless information on the post-liberalization tariff rates, hence facilitating considerably the negotiations, 
especially for the poorest countries short of negotiating staff.  Last, but not least, the formula efficiency allows 
to treat differently various groups of countries by agreeing on different coefficients for each of these groups – 
a key feature helpful for addressing the Single Undertaking issue and the trade and development nexus (see 
below).  In short, the Swiss formula is extremely well adapted to the concept of shorter but more frequent 
Rounds. 
Unfortunately, two decisions amounted to void the Hong Kong decision on the Swiss formula of its substance.  
Firstly, the WTO negotiators agreed on various exceptions to the use of the Swiss formula for “sensitive” 
industrial products.  Secondly, they are still using a much less efficient formula in agriculture, combined with 
even more exceptions.  The potential coverage and magnitude of all these exceptions are so large that they 
amount to void the formulas adopted of substance. 
Why such strategic mistakes?  First, and foremost, is that the negotiators of the industrial countries have 
stuck to a very narrow interpretation of the Binding Tariff principle equating liberalization to a change such as 
all the post-Doha bound tariffs should be lower than the pre-Doha applied tariffs (see below). 17/  This 
interpretation has induced the negotiators of the industrial countries to “overshoot” their initial requests in 
industrial products by requesting “too” low Swiss coefficients from their trading partners, hence pushing the 
latter to react by requesting vast exceptions, and ultimately offering the EC and almost a dozen of industrial 
countries (the so-called G10) to do the same in agriculture – a sequence making the final package of 
concessions in industrial and agricultural products unpredictable to the point to become useless. 18/ 
That said, it is unrealistic to believe that multilateral trade negotiations could be based on a mere formula 
without exceptions.  The lesson is thus that the implicit trade off between any level of the Swiss coefficient 
and the magnitude of the accompanying exceptions (the higher the Swiss coefficient is, the smaller the 
demand for exceptions is) should be made explicit as quickly and simply as possible.  The magnitude of the 
exceptions could be expressed as a deviation from the average post-Round bound tariff (negotiators tend to 
use average tariffs as ways of negotiations) generated by a given Swiss coefficient, and certain conditions 
could be imposed on the distribution of this deviation over the individual tariffs of the country in question.  For 
instance, if a Swiss coefficient of 20 generates an average post-Round tariff of 15 percent for a given country, 
the agreed exceptions could allow the average tariff to go up to 16 percent, conditionally to the fact that this 
“degree of freedom” would not generate an individual tariff higher by more than 10 percentage points than the 
tariff generated by the Swiss coefficient 20. 
Shorter and more frequent Rounds mean that agreeing on a higher Swiss coefficient (that is, on a lower level 
of liberalisation) may be the price to be paid for granting less exceptions in the current Round, but also that 
this price is affordable because it will not be paid for a long period of time, with another Round coming in a not 
 
16 / The “Swiss” formula is T=(r*t)/(r+t) where r is called the Swiss coefficient.  This coefficient r defines the highest possible post-
liberalization tariff..  When t is very small, r/(r+t) approaches 1 so that T equals t (post-liberalization tariffs will be about the same as the 
low pre-liberalization tariff).  When t (pre-liberalization tariff) is very high, t/(r+t) approaches 1 so that T (post-liberalization tariff) equals r. 
17 / In addition, clearly many negotiators did not initially realize that a Swiss coefficient defines the highest possible post-Doha tariff for 
initial tariffs much higher than those observable in the real world.  For instance, if the coefficient is 20, the post-Doha tariff becomes 
higher than 19 percent for a pre-Doha tariff close to 500 percent, a tariff level very rare in the real world.  For the highest tariffs not too 
rare in today world (say 100 percent) the post-Doha tariff with a Swiss 20 is 14 percent only. 
18 /As usually in negotiations, once the exceptions were written down in the July 2004 text, it becomes very difficult to negotiate a trade-
off based on “buying” a lower level of exceptions by a higher Swiss coefficient. 
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too distant future.  In short, the repeated use of the Swiss formula should work as a patient peeling of the 
onion. 
H. A Necessary Condition:  Re-assessing the Value of Binding Tariffs 
There is a necessary condition for an efficient use of the Swiss formula:  a re-assessment of the Bound Tariff 
principle.  Bound tariffs are the only ones to generate legal commitments in the WTO.  Moreover, the principle 
of bound tariffs makes a lot of sense from an economic point of view.  Evidence shows a strong relation 
between a low level of average tariff water and good domestic governance (as measured by the ranking of 
the ease of doing business) among the WTO membership. 
That said, the current interpretation of the Bound Tariff principle as equating liberalization to a change such as 
all the bound tariffs enforced after a Round should be lower than the tariffs applied before the Round misses a 
key point.  This is the fact that the Doha Round occurs at a very special time, that is, at the end of a period 
where many developing countries have substantially lowered their applied tariffs, while still being reluctant to 
decrease their bound tariffs.  Available information [WTO 2006] shows that 104 WTO Members (out of 143, or 
more accurately 117 if one counts the EC as one Member) enforce applied tariffs lower than their bound 
tariffs, with 70 of these Members having an average “tariff water” (the difference between their bound and 
applied tariffs) higher than 10 percent.  Tariff water can reach impressing average levels in some cases 
(around 100 percent).  Out of these 70 countries, 21 can be classified as emerging economies, the rest being 
developing countries. 19
This special situation makes easy to understand why the current interpretation of the Bound Tariff principle is 
a major stumbling block in the Doha Round.  However, there are three good reasons to challenge this 
interpretation. 
Firstly, if binding has a value because it brings legal certainty, cutting bound tariffs should have a value for 
businesses even if these cuts leave unchanged the existing applied tariffs.  Such an interpretation is 
particularly suitable to a situation characterized by large tariff water, as today.  Even if short to cut applied 
tariffs, cuts in bound tariffs can be substantial, hence delivering a lot of this certainty that businesses 
appreciate above all.  The Doha Round should be seen as a “Round of transition” which could leave some 
differentials between bound and currently applied tariffs, but which should reduce them enough to ensure 
their elimination in the Round following the Doha Round. 
Secondly, the value of the binding principle for the trading partners of a country is not absolute, but relative.  It 
may first depend on international factors, and it happens to be the case of the Doha Round, another 
specificity of this Round that should be taken into account.  In particular, the fact that India would bind some 
of its tariffs at a level higher than their currently applied rates represents an affordable risk for its trading 
partners in the current context.  This is because, if India wants to be as attractive as China for the world 
traders and investors, it has to offer roughly the same tariff conditions than Chinese bound tariffs.  In short, 
Chinese bound tariffs work as proxies of bound tariffs in India (and a few economies at the same stage of 
development).  “Peer pressure” counts. 
Lastly, the value of a country’s bound tariffs for its trading partners may also depend on domestic factors in 
the country in question – in particular, the dispersion among the country’s tariffs.  Because protection granted 
to some domestic producers gives them an advantage at the detriment of the other domestic producers, 
domestic producers lobbying for an increase in a given applied tariff are likely to face increasing opposition 
from their fellow domestic producers as and when the requested tariff increase comes closer to the highest 
existing tariffs of the country.  In short, the most dispersed the tariff rates imposed by a country are, the riskier 
its unbound tariffs are for its trading partners, hence the higher the value of bindings is for the partners. 
Such a link between the value of binding and domestic tariff dispersion has an important corollary.  There are 
strong incentives not to raise applied tariffs in a country which is enforcing an “uniform” tariff (the same tariff 
on all the products it imports) even if these tariffs are not bound.  This is because domestic producers would 
immediately oppose a move favoring one of them (the producer getting a higher tariff) but disadvantageous to 
all the others.  It is not by accident that two (Chile and Singapore) out of the three WTO Members having 
unilaterally adopted an uniform tariff structure have still not bound their tariffs at their applied level (the tariff 
 
19 /All the existing coalitions have strong links with the bound tariff issue.  23 out of 24 Small and Vulnerable Economies, 29 out of the 32 
Least Developed Countries, 32 out of the 38 members of the G33, and 5 out of the 6 Recently Acceeding Members (RAMs) exhibit 
average tariff water.  The averages are high (respectively 37.3 percent, 32.8 percent, and 31.3 percent) except for the RAMs group (3.2 
percent), a striking illustration of the unbalanced situation faced by the new Members. 
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water is huge for Chile which has bound its tariffs at 25 percent while applying an uniform tariff of 6 percent).  
In short, the more uniform the tariffs of a country are, the less the absence of binding these tariffs could have 
negative consequences for the trading partners of this country. 
In short, the demand for binding tariffs should be modulated in order to take into account the “transition” 
feature of the Doha Round, the intensity of the “peer pressure”, the magnitude of dispersion of the tariff 
structure of the country in question, and, as shown below, the level of flexibility in the interpretation of the 
Single Undertaking. 
 
I. Market Access in Services:  Plurilaterals and the “Coalitions of the Willing” 
Opening market in services requires trust in partners for undertaking the adequate pro-competitive regulatory 
reforms.  The dimensions of trust are manifold:  overcome reluctance over movement of people (mode 4) and 
sensitive sectors (maritime, health, education, audiovisuals, etc.) promote conclusions of mutual recognition 
agreements without GATS Article VII disciplines, etc.  Trust is all the more necessary because regulatory 
reforms call for a dynamic process of continuous changes which is very hard to forecast when negotiating the 
initial trade agreement.  The huge WTO membership (150 Members) is so heterogeneous in terms of both 
regulatory capacities and willingness to undertake the necessary reforms that it is a strong handicap for 
reaching substantial liberalization in services in the WTO forum – hence the attraction of bilaterals in services.  
But, as already underlined, bilaterals in services can be very costly because the high level of protection in 
services would induce many of them to focus on market preferences with its negative consequences. 
At the Hong Kong Ministerial, the Doha negotiators have made a first step for enhancing the WTO negotiating 
process in services when they have agreed to undertake negotiations in a “plurilateral” framework limited to 
the countries willing to open their markets on a sector by sector basis.  This initiative is close to a very 
successful negotiating process used for the first time at the 1996 Singapore Ministerial for the Financial 
Services Agreement and for the Information Technology Agreement which have both been successful. 
Plurilaterals at the WTO offer a good compromise between bilaterals and the fully multilateral approach if they 
address a few additional pending issues [Adlung 2006, Hoekman 2006]. 20  In particular, they should define 
the “critical mass” of Members (in number or economic size) to be reached for materializing potential 
agreements.  They should also design the “reference papers” spelling out the basic regulatory disciplines that 
the signatories should aim at establishing in each service sector.  And they should ensure that any latecomer 
to a sectoral agreement will not be subjected to commitments other than those included in the initial 
agreement. 
As suggested above, bilaterals may remain relatively attractive in services because of the need of deep trust 
between the signatories.  This may be particularly the case of agreements on the transitory movement of 
persons (mode 4) which looks much easier to develop initially on a bilateral basis.  As a result, in addition to 
generating plurilateral agreements, an essential role of the WTO in services liberalization would be to 
multilateralise the existing or future bilaterals in services.  In this perspective, the Rounds should be relatively 
frequent in order not to leave too long periods without opening the possibility to launch a catching up process.  
In sum, in addition to reasons related to the likely “lack of leadership” among the major trading partners, the 
huge domain of services (by far, the most important in size and in welfare gains for the coming decades) 
offers a good intrinsic reason to have more frequent Rounds. 
J. Re-interpreting the Single Undertaking Principle:  “Positive Discrimination” 
The prevailing interpretation of the Single Undertaking principle is that every WTO Member shall sign all the 
agreements negotiated during a Round (or, at least, to achieve consensus on the conclusion of negotiations 
across all areas).  The principle was adopted during the Uruguay Round, and it was then felt necessary for 
making the multilateral trade regime more consistent.  At this time, such an interpretation made a lot of sense 
for two reasons.  Firstly, the Uruguay Round agreements concentrate on general goals and rules (liberalizing 
trade in agriculture and services, regulating subsidies, norms and standards, etc.) that every WTO Member 
should agree on in order to ensure a minimal consistency of the multilateral trade regime.  Secondly, the 
 
20 /Exanples for MFN-based plutilaterals are the Fourth and Fifth Protocols on basic telecommunications (February 1997) and on 
financial services (December 1997). 
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Uruguay Round negotiations on market access remained de facto limited to industrial products, a process 
initiated so many years ago that it was rightly felt reasonable to involve all the WTO Members in it, all the 
more because many developing countries were unilaterally liberalizing. 
Ten years later, such a strict interpretation is backfiring.  It has greatly compounded the problem raised by the 
enlargement of the WTO membership by making the WTO negotiating process a hostage of the Members 
which are the most reluctant to liberalise.  And it has fuelled a process of systemic evasion from the WTO 
framework through the definition of groups of WTO Members getting exempted from various specific WTO 
obligations.  The Least Developed Countries were the first to get a special status, early in the Uruguay 
Round.  They were followed by the Net Food Importing Developing Countries during the very last days of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations.  Since the launch of the Doha Round, other exceptions have been tabled:  the 
Small and Vulnerable Economies, the Cotton Producers, the Recently Acceeding Members (RAMs). 
And the list is not closed.  In particular, there is the increasingly loud request by a substantial number of 
developing countries to have a status distinct from those enjoyed de facto by the emerging economies and de 
jure by the least developed economies.  If such a new group is created, very few “developing countries” would 
still be abiding by all the WTO rules – making a mockery of the Single Undertaking principle.  Even worse, 
such an approach (based on the skills of negotiators able to sneak in their country at a propitious moment) 
generates an irrational, chaotic and ultimately unjust WTO forum:  some recent WTO Members do not enjoy 
the LDC status although they are as poor as the richest LDCs (or are being pushed to the limits, such as 
Cambodia and Nepal);  many WTO Members are more genuinely dependent from food imports than the few 
which extracted a special status ten years ago [Zedillo and Messerlin 2005];  the SVE coalition includes the 
68th world largest economy (out of 182 economies), etc. 
Such an approach based on “negative discrimination” is unsatisfactory on several other grounds.  Firstly, it 
requires to find objective criteria for defining a group.  The task has not been too difficult when defining the 
“poorest” countries (although there are still pending questions) but it is much harder in all the other cases, as 
best illustrated by the SVEs’ struggle to define their own group.  Secondly, the agreement from the WTO 
Members not pertaining to a proposed group is very hard to get, risking to block the whole WTO machinery 
for years.  Thirdly, once created, groups are hard to be dissolved (even if the rationale behind them has 
disappeared) meaning that exceptions are granted for ever.  Lastly, and perhaps crucially, a group tends to 
be a “prison” for the most dynamic members of the groups to the extent that it is very difficult for a group 
member to breach the ranks, and to opt for a freer trade policy if it suddenly realizes that it is in its own 
interests. 
The WTO is thus at a crossroad.  Either, the current strict interpretation of the Single Undertaking prevails, 
and there will be permanent centripetal forces to make “group exceptions”, and to desintegrate the WTO 
forum.  Or the Single Undertaking principle is re-interpreted in such a way that it preempts the creation of 
such groups.  In this perspective, it should be conceived as enforceable at distant periods of time, not 
continuously.  Between two enforcements, the WTO negotiation process should allow Members to 
“discriminate positively”, that is, to open further their markets by participating in plurilateral agreements 
subject to MFN-consistent implementation without waiting for an agreement among all the Members – an  
extension of the approach suggested for services to other topics. 
A key side-benefit of the positive discrimination approach would be to reduce the pressure imposed on the 
WTO system by its vastly enlarged membership.  By definition, plurilaterals will involve a lower number of 
countries.  This will dramatically change the level of nuisance that reluctant countries can exert on the whole 
system.  The lower the critical mass of signatories imposed for giving birth to a plurilateral agreement is, the 
easier it will be for the plurilateral to avoid to be hostage of reluctant negotiators. 
Of course, a “positive discrimination” approach would require several clarifications.  Firstly, which could be the 
topics concerned by a positive discrimination approach (a question to be approved by all WTO Members)?  
An obvious candidate is public procurement (already under this approach).  By contrast, tariff cuts in industrial 
products should still involve all the Members because it is the core of the multilateral trade regime since five 
decades, and all the more because a subtle use of the formula approach can provide all the necessary 
flexibility.  Secondly, how much time would lapse between two enforcements?  There is no a priori answer to 
this question.  It depends on the boldness of the liberalization moves made by the coalitions of the willings, 
and on the winds of bilateralism vs. those of multilateralism. 
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K. Mellowing the bilaterals:  Multilateralizing the Rules of Origin 
The above suggestions should greatly reduce the attraction of bilaterals in general.  By targetting protection 
peaks in goods and services, they should particularly cut the ground under the bilaterals focusing on trade 
preferences – the most costly type of bilaterals for the signatories as well as for the multilateral trade regime.  
That said, bilaterals are unlikely to disappear totally, if only because some of them have a political dimension 
that the WTO will never be able to cope with.  There is thus a need to reduce the harm that existing and future 
bilaterals could do to the WTO trade regime. 
The rules of origin imposed by bilaterals are generally seen as the biggest source of problems created by 
these deals [Baldwin 2006, Cadot 2006]. 21/  “Multilateralising” these rules seems the best way to significantly 
reduce these costs.  It is a hard task because the many criteria defining the rules of origin (tariff schedules, 
tariff level, content level, sectoral specificities, etc.) change from bilateral to bilateral [Cadot and de Melo 
2006].  “Harmonising” the rules of origin seems largely out of reach in the short and medium run, except 
around hubs (the EC or the U.S.) with the risk that such hubs have substantial perverse effects. 
As a result, the most accessible option for multilateralising the rules of origin seems to rely on the notion of 
“equivalent” tariffs, that is, tariffs close enough to each other for having no noticeable differences in their 
economic impact [Wonnacott 1996].  The lowest key version of this option would be to consider all the tariff 
lines with tariffs comprised between 0 and (say) 5 percent enforced in the world as equivalent, so that all the 
products subjected to such tariffs would be considered of “domestic” origin.  A more ambitious version would 
be to define all tariff lines with tariff preferential margins smaller than (say) 5 percent as equivalent.  It is 
useful to observer that both versions have the additional advantage to induce WTO Members to shift their 
tariffs close to the ceiling tariff inside the tariff band. 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
There is no way to impose the above described effort on WTO negotiators.  But, the six proposals support 
each other, so that each of them could be used more gently, a feature favoring compromises.  None of these 
proposals infringe the basic principles of the current multilateral trade regime.  They merely re-assess the 
current interpretation of these principles. 
Who could be the “agents” of such an effort?  An easy answer is the U.S., Japan and the EC, still the three 
largest economies and those with the longest experience in the WTO.  Indeed, there are already proposals in 
this direction [Atlantic Council 2007] and key politicians have launched ideas in this direction (German 
Chancelor Merkel, U.S. Senator Baucus). 
However, if these countries are necessary, they are not sufficient.  The current balance of forces in the WTO 
forum and a really business-friendly perspective require a broader support which requires an active role from 
medium-size economies.  For obvious reasons, the GATT/WTO history has always focused on the largest 
players, with the U.S.-EC “tête à tête” of the 1960s to the 1980s, the Quad (Canada, EC, Japan and the U.S.) 
in the 1980s and 1990s, and the Five (or Six) Interested Parties, the last incarnation of this tendency before 
the pre-Hong Kong Ministerial.  However, in the past, the role of the medium-size economies has always 
been essential for moving the GATT/WTO process at critical times.  Australia, Canada, Columbia, New 
Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, etc., have often been critical for preparing crucial deals.  Asian medium-sized 
economies, such as Korea for instance, should join the group. 
The paper has focused on the WTO per se.  But, as well known, the success of WTO negotiations – and of 
trade liberalisation – ultimatly depends on the domestic forces working in the Members.  A strong domestic 
support is essential to a more efficient WTO negotiating process.  Such a support should not be stated only in 
general terms (average tariff cut, gains from trade and domestic regulatory reforms, etc.) as it is too often 
today, because such terms are difficult to grasp by the public opinion. 
 
21 / Paradoxically, strict rules of origin may be positive from a WTO perspective because they limit so much the impact of the bilaterals 
that their signatories ultimatly have to have recourse to the existing multilateral trade regime.  However, this argument is limited to the 
bilaterals focusing on trade-preference, and it ignores the fact that strict rules of origin generate a high level of frustration which ultimately 
hurts the WTO regime as well. 
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Rather, domestic support should focus on providing the best possible, most concrete information on the 
highest domestic barriers – be the peak tariffs on imports of goods, the most inefficient regulations in 
services, the highest subsidies in goods and services, etc.  Paradoxically, and ironically, a support focused on 
peak protection would also help negotiators.  For instinctive reasons, trade negotiators tend to ask more from 
their trading partners than their own businesses.  For instance, European negotiators have insisted on tariff 
cuts from the emerging economies in NAMA much larger that those requested by the EC businesses 
[Messerlin 2007]. 
A focus on peak protection would help to dissipate a frequent misunderstanding in the public opinion – that 
protection is in the “public interest” whereas freer trade favors narrow-minded “private interests”.  After all, 
economic analysis, history and good political sense suggest that, by definition, protection is keeping the statu 
quo situation, hence that it can only favor the most powerful groups in place, at the detriment of the infant 
economic and social forces.  For instance, the debate on agricultural protection has profoundly changed in 
Europe since the 2001 Doha Ministerial, when it has shifted from generalities on farm liberalization to a very 
concrete point, that is, the largest beneficiaries of the current protection.  As a result, not only Europeans are 
in favor of serious cuts in subsidies (including in France) [German Marshall Fund 2006] but the most dynamic 
European farmers are beginning to distance themselves from the existing CAP. 
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Annex 1.  Why Have Small Countries Led the Bilaterals Game So Far? 
The continuing attraction for bilaterals has another source than the pure economic costs and benefits to be 
expected from them which have been underlined in section 2.  It flows from political economy considerations 
based on the domestic costs and benefits of concluding bilaterals relative to those of concluding WTO deals.  
This approach is interesting because it offers an explanation of the leading role of the small countries in the 
post-1995 bilaterals documented by Table 1 – a fact that the economic analysis of regionalism based on 
“optimal tariff” is not able to cope with. 
The balance of domestic forces in a small country are likely to be the same, or even to be more favorable, in 
the case of a bilateral than in the case of a WTO deal.  The small country’s import-competing industries are 
likely to face roughly the same competitive forces in the case of a bilateral with a large country than in the 
case of a WTO agreement because the large country producers are roughly as efficient as world producers 
for a wide range of goods.  Meanwhile, the small country’s exporters are likely to perceive a bilateral as 
providing them as many as (or possibly even more) export opportunities than a WTO agreement for two 
reasons:  the large country markets are large enough for absorbing their export capacities, and the bilateral 
may exclude their competitors – this last reason shifting the balance of domestic forces in favor of a bilateral, 
compared to a WTO deal, and pushing the small countries to be “leaders” in terms of bilaterals. 
From a large country perspective, the domestic costs and benefits of a bilateral relative to a WTO deal are 
quite different.  A bilateral subjects the import-competing industries of the large signatory to a much more 
limited competition than a WTO deal, and it provides much more limited opportunities for the domestic 
exporters than a WTO agreement.  In sum, a bilateral with a small country may simply get unnoticed in the 
large country, hence their tendency to be “followers”. 
Going beyond pure trade interests, bilaterals can be attractive for three other reasons.  Firstly, they are a 
much more malleable foreign policy instrument than a WTO deal.  Many negotiations on trade bilaterals have 
been launched on the assumption that they will strengthen infant political relations, or that they will rejuvenate 
fading political relations.  Once again, this feature is likely to reinforce the leading position of the small 
countries – it is much more rewarding for a small country to talk to a large country than the converse.  By 
contrast, the WTO is a place where political considerations are “dissolved” by the non-discriminatory principle.  
This feature may be very useful in specific cases (for instance, the accession of Iran to the WTO allows to 
avoid direct talks between the U.S. and Iran while still opening their markets to each other).  But, the WTO 
can hardly be helpful for smoothing the ups and downs of the day-by-day international relations. 
Secondly, bilaterals are also a much more malleable domestic policy instrument than a WTO deal.  Trade 
Ministers are generally junior ministers with little or no control over the country’s global political agenda – be 
the timing of the liberalization programme, the scope of the industries to be covered, the balance of the 
domestic interests to be included, etc. 22/  Bilaterals fit much better the limited power of Trade Ministers (and 
their hope for more prestigious ministerial portfolios) because they offer more freedom than WTO negotiations 
in managing the timing and the marketing of the deal, in carving out its coverage and defining the domestic 
interests to be involved.  By contrast, WTO negotiations are hardly manageable in terms of timing, they are 
exposed to negatively-charged media, hence difficult to handle by the junior Trade Ministers, and their scope 
is hardly under control since it has to accommodate a large number of Members. 
Lastly, bilaterals have the formidable capacity to include “trade-related” issues which are too contentious to be 
easily managed in the WTO.  These so-called “WTO Plus” issues range from intellectual property rights 
enforcement to geographical indications to competition policy, etc.  The capacity of bilaterals to deliver WTO-
Plus provisions may be their Achilles’ heel for two reasons.  Firstly, “WTO-Plus” provisions included in the 
bilaterals tend to be much stricter than the similar WTO provisions [Fink and Reichenmiller 2005].  Indeed, 
they are often introduced by the large signatory with the hope to re-import them into the WTO forum.  
Secondly, the implementation of WTO-Plus provisions may be more closely monitored by tailor-made 
provisions included in the bilaterals.  As a result, “WTO-Plus” provisions in bilaterals can be easily perceived 
as a “neo-imperial” approach pursued by the large country, all the more because they generally deal with truly 
domestic “behind-the-border” policies. 
 
22 /There are exceptions, such as Australia or Chile, where trade policy is so much intertwined with foreign policy that it is  handled by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  In the case of loose federal unions (such as the EC) bilaterals offer to the Trade Ministers of the union’s 
Member States room for autonomous initiatives. 
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In sum, taking into account the above trade and non-trade interests suggests that negotiations on bilaterals 
between a small and a large countries are likely to be successful.  However, this conclusion faces limits.  The 
two first ones concern mostly the small signatories.  Bilaterals have difficulties to handle crucial “rules” 
problems, such as subsidies (it is impossible to design subsidies so that they would have no impact on 
specific trading partners, as best illustrated by the severe difficulties faced by Mexico with subsidized U.S. 
maize) and they create a huge source of problems when enforcing the rules of origin.  The “neo-imperial” 
dimension of the WTO-Plus provisions creates serious risks of bitterness and conflicts in the small signatory, 
as illustrated by the TRIPs dispute between Thailand and the U.S., or by the recurrent disputes between the 
EC and Turkey.  The third limit concerns mostly the large signatories.  The tiny costs and benefits of the 
bilaterals with small countries are not for them an insurance against sudden and violent oppositions from 
domestic stringy vested interests which may have the sufficient magnitude to stop (or at least endanger) the 
envisaged bilateral, as best illustrated by sensitive farm or food products (such as sugar, bananas, tuna, etc.). 
This discussion deserves a final remark.  The above arguments suggest that bilaterals between a large 
country and a “not so small” country are doomed to be much more difficult, as best illustrated by the EU-
Mercosur negotiating saga or by the U.S.-South Africa case.  This is because the domestic balance between 
the relative costs and benefits of bilaterals compared to WTO negotiations is likely to be negative in both 
countries.  In the large country, import-competing industries may fear, with good reasons, that the competitive 
pressures of the “not so small” partner’s exporters could be as powerful as those generated by full scale WTO 
negotiations (if the not so small country’s exporters are among the most efficient in the world, such as 
Brazilian sugar producers) triggering the same strong opposition to a bilateral than to a WTO deal.  And the 
large country export interests are likely to continue to find the market access opportunities offered by the 
bilateral much less interesting than those provided by a WTO deal – simply because the markets of the not-
so-small partner may still be significantly smaller than the world markets available with a WTO deal.  
Meanwhile, in the “not-so-small” country, the exporters’ lobbies may find the large country’s markets not large 
enough for their export capacities, whereas the import-competing lobbies may be as afraid of the large 
country’s competitors as of those from the entire world. 
 
